

REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE

ARMENIA, AUSCHWITZ, AND BEYOND

PARAGON HOUSE

CHAPTER 2

The Symbiotic Relationship between Turks and Armenians: A Macabre Outcome Obstructing Healing and Reconciliation

RUBINA PEROOMIAN

The Armenian-Turkish relationship spans the long period since the eleventh-century incursions of Seljuk, Mongol, and other Turko-Mongol tribes toward the west, the final encroachment of the Armenian plateau, and the eventual establishment of the Ottoman rule over Armenia.¹ The basic principles for this relationship, established at the outset with the initial contact on the battlefield and the terror spread within the civil society, were those of the conqueror and the conquered and consequently the ruler and the ruled. They also developed through time through governmental policies on minorities, especially during the Ottoman era, down to the societal perceptions and behavior. The outcome was a sort of a *modus vivendi* between these two people quite dissimilar in ethnicity, religion, culture, tradition, and history.

During centuries of coexistence, intermingling through marriage and conversion to the religion of the ruler majority was inevitable. Beginning with the Seljuk invasions, the kidnapping of thousands of Armenian women to keep as wives or concubines or to sell in the slave markets was a usual practice. So was the capturing of Armenian youth to serve in military forces. These captives were all forced to convert to Islam. Voluntary conversions for social, economic, and/or social gain were also abundant. In fact Muslim Armenian men reached high positions in ruling circles and in the army, and Muslim Armenian women mothered heirs of the thrones. In the process of this long coexistence, besides ethnic co-mingling, Muslim rulers of Turkic origin adopted many traits from Armenian culture and lifestyle.²

After going through a series of devastating incursions and submerging into a dark age in terms of political and cultural life, Armenia and Armenians were incorporated into the huge Ottoman Empire. During this period, as Dickran Kouymjian attests, “[D]espite devastating invasions, accompanied by pillaging and enslavement, despite taxes on a level never before imposed, despite the recurring famines, occasional plagues, locusts Armenians tried to maintain Armenian life as they understood it At times the struggle must have seemed unsurmountable, the nation condemned.”³

In addition to the official policy of absolute subjugation, the unbri-dled Turkish and Kurdish assaults on Armenian rural communities, confiscation of a large part of the harvest and personal belongings, and most dreadfully the kidnapping of young women, had created an atmosphere of fear among Armenians and a state of social death. While *Devshirme*, the gathering of Christian youth, and Armenians among them, was many times beneficial for the youth who did not remember their origin, it was another brutal practice to spread terror and break the Christian, in this case the Armenian, family. The gathered male children were Islamized and given the best education to serve in high ranking positions in the system.⁴

Armenian culture and civilization suffered significant setbacks, and Armenians, the brave mountaineers of the Armenian highlands, with a long history of struggle for national freedom, were turned into subservient slaves, under constant harassment and persecution. Turkish-Armenian relationship was more like that of a lord and a serf.

In this overall relationship, it was only natural for Armenians to see the Turks and the Kurds, who at that time were not considered a separate ethnic group but only mountain Turks, as frightful evil-doers. Likewise, Turks perceived Armenians as infidels, unbelievers or *giavours*, slaves of the Muslims, *rayas*, and *fallahs*.

To avoid simplification of the equation in this relationship, the gradual rise of the Armenian traders, the *khojas* in the rural areas, beginning mid-15th century, and later the *chelebies*, the industrialists in the urban areas giving way to *amiras*, the financial and industrial magnates of the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire should also be taken into consideration. They were wealthy, influential, and supported Armenian

religious and cultural undertakings. Their role in this equation, based on their prominence in the empire's economy, added a feeling of jealousy on the part of the Turkish officials and the society at large. This jealousy was often translated into hate and malevolence as an added ingredient in the Turkish-Armenian relationship. In this long symbiotic period before WWI, stereotyping and name-calling were thus expected phenomena.

In the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire, Armenians were segregated, like Greeks and Jews, as a religious-ethnic community with the legal status of a *millet*, second class citizens, subjected to discriminatory laws and taxation. They had to wear distinctive signs or clothing to indicate their being non-Muslims. They were not allowed to bear arms or to ride a horse. Apparently, Armenians were the most obedient *millet* and made less trouble for the Ottoman sultans, so over time they were viewed as good and honest people and were called *millet-i-sadika* (the loyal *millet*).

The Armenian-Turkish *modus vivendi* lost its livable balance in the late 18th and 19th centuries with, on the one hand, the economic, political, and social decay of the Empire, which meant more pressure on Armenians to collect additional taxes and more frequent assaults in rural areas for financial gains. On the other hand, on the Armenian side, liberal ideas infiltrating from Europe had brought about a cultural and political revival which resulted in attempts to call on the Sublime Porte and demand reforms and amelioration of the Armenian plight with some also resorting to armed self-defense against their assailants.

As a result of this development, the Turkish iron fist pressed more heavily and the Turkish-Armenian relationship was studded with sporadic massacres, forced Islamization of groups of Armenians, and persecution of Armenian revolutionaries, including incarceration in filthy prisons, torture and hangings. Armenian popular culture of the period—songs, sayings, and anecdotes—are manifestations of a complex collective psyche structured by fear, hatred, helplessness, frustration, and even vengefulness.

The period immediately preceding the Young Turk Revolution,⁵ beginning from April 1908, was one of yearning and anticipation for both Armenian and Turkish intellectuals. Promises of equality, freedom, brotherhood, and justice could efface the centuries of acrimony and the

bitter memory of maltreatment to bring about a peaceful coexistence among the two peoples who were destined (or, rather, condemned) to live side-by-side, even intermingled with each other. There was hope of a better future in the air.

In a letter dated October 16, 1908, written to her husband in Paris, Zabel Essayan (1878-1942),⁶ a prominent female writer and an eyewitness to the events in Constantinople, optimistically stated: "The two nations have now begun to understand each other's mentality, and they had time to penetrate each other's inner feelings. Now no administration can set one against the other."⁷ But there does not seem an absolute trust to exist vis-à-vis the leadership, as to how the implementation of the great change would go, and how the masses would perceive the ideology of the Revolution. Further down in that same letter, she writes, "This race has something incorrigibleWe have daily proof of this."

In any event, the artificially aroused honeymoon between the oppressors and the oppressed in the Empire was short-lived. The massacre of Armenians in Cilicia, only a few months after the revolution, was a shocking manifestation of the continuing policy of Turkification or rather Ottomanization as the ideology of the time suggested. In April, 1909, concurrent with the counter-revolution movement in Constantinople, the same anti-revolutionary, reactionary elements instigated the Muslim masses to attack Armenian quarters in Adana. Pillage and murder followed in this city with a significant Armenian population. Armenians were being punished for their outspoken support of the Revolution and claiming equality and justice they did not deserve. Soon the massacres spread to other Armenian towns and villages in Cilicia. It is believed that the Turkish army regiment ordered to stop the carnage was deliberately late to arrive. It is also believed that these soldiers entering in Adana actually participated in the attacks.⁸

As a member of the second delegation sent by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, Esayan visited the disaster stricken area to assess the loss and provide means of assistance. In a letter to her husband, dated June 18, 1909 from Mersin, she writes, "Cilicia is destroyed.... The Armenian people have fallen victim to a premeditated plan.... The conspiracy of the present government is evident.... For centuries our hard working people have nourished our enemy. Today, they receive their

reward.... Even cannibals are better than these monsters; at least they eat each other to satiate their hunger.”⁹ Her addressee is not this and that Turk, the criminal, the culprit, or the conspirator, but the entire nation, the Turkish race (if there is such a thing after so much mingling of Turkic tribes with the locals). In an effort to explain the Turkish behavioral pattern, in that same letter, she compares the “national characteristics” of the two peoples and concludes that one is civilized, builds, and creates; the other nurtures bloody aspirations and destroys.

In *Averaknerun mej* (Amid the Ruins), a collection of stories depicting her devastating encounter with the agonizing situation, Esayan views the victimizers through the eyes of Armenian orphans left behind after the carnage, and these eyes reflect unspeakable horror, the slaughter of their parents they have witnessed. They see the Turk as a cold-blooded murderer whose eyes burn with evil passion to destroy and kill.¹⁰ To their victims’ last prayers these killers responded laughing, “You don’t have a God. Just as your Christ died by torture, so will each one of you die by torture.”¹¹

In this detailed eyewitness account, she portrays the hatred that Turks hold against Armenians, and shows that even Turkish women are not immune to this destructive sentiment. She describes a Turkish woman crushing the head of an Armenian child as he knelt over his mother’s dead body. Another Turkish woman loaded wounded Armenians onto a carriage as if to save their lives only to push them into the river.¹² The thrill of bloodshed and plunder intoxicated them so much so that they forgot the friendship and the salt and bread they shared for long years with their Armenian neighbors.

Suren Partevian (1876-1921),¹³ a member of the first delegation to visit Cilicia, has a similar take on the 1909 Cilician massacres. His hopes are shattered. He believes that “the Armenian-Turkish brotherhood is being strangled, murdered, and buried in the ashes and blood in Cilicia,” and doubts if Armenians could ever have a future in the new society ruled by the Ittihad (Young Turk) party.¹⁴ In one of the essays in his collection of eyewitness accounts, he quotes a wounded and dying Armenian priest, “If my God is also the God of these unbelievers, these ferocious beasts, I don’t believe in God...I don’t believe in God.”¹⁵

So, even before the massacres and deportations of the war years,

Armenian trust in Turkish goodwill was shattered. A wound was slashed open that would not heal. As Partevian put it, "There is something broken, something sunken in our souls; there is a ravage of faith, a pain of frustration that will remain unhealed."¹⁶

The Turkish-Armenian relationship was increasingly deteriorating. Worsening the situation and adding to the whetted sentiments was the government initiated anti-Armenian or rather anti-Christian propaganda just before and during the war years, the November 21, 1914 calling of Jihad, a holy war against Christians with undercurrent emphasis on Armenians. Turks were being instigated to see Armenians as vermin, microbes, infidel *giavours* or *kafirs*, enemies of Islam unworthy of living; in other words, deserving to be killed. Degradation and dehumanization of the victim facilitated their extermination, and the perpetrators were instinctively aware of that.

Hatred for Armenians had been transmitted from generation to generation, manipulated from time to time according to governmental policies and ground sharper if necessary. The testimonial stories of Hagop Oshagan (1883-1948)¹⁷ are manifestations of this phenomenon. "A fifteen year old hero [Turkish of course] had nailed the head of a slaughtered man [Armenian of course] to the end of a long wooden stick. The eyes were gouged out, and the eyebrows were plucked. The stick on his shoulder and a rifle on his chest, he walked up and down the streets of the Armenian village to experience the pleasure of the terror he spread among women and children around him."¹⁸ The year was 1915.

This is not only an appalling childish game, but also an act of religious gratification. God's name is ultimately sanctified through the shedding of the blood of the infidel, burning and looting their belongings, while praying to that same God to give strength to their arms and peace to their conscience to continue their holy work. The old religious leader of the Turkish village, dressed in white, the embodiment of God himself, gives the first example to start the carnage. His victim is the priest of the Armenian village down below. The God of Islam observes the carnage and accepts the sacrifices the Turkish villagers offer to him. The slaughter of the entire Armenian village is completed, and "the old man's soul found a rare satisfaction that only a sacrifice of such a grand scale could offer. His conscience was stilled and cleared with that sacred offering."¹⁹

Sultan Abdul Hamid's political message corroborated what the holy Jihad was propagating. He too had proclaimed, "Whoever oppresses the Christians is a true son of the Turkish homeland."²⁰

The Turkish-Armenian relationship had reached rock-bottom. With a sarcastic tone, Oshagan cites the biblical analogy of wolves and lambs grazing together. By presenting this metaphor for the Turkish Armenian relationship, he derides the naïveté of the world to believe that such things are ever possible. Like Essayan, Oshagan too examines racial attributes as well as cultural, religious, and traditional factors that shape the victimizer's behavior. "From the vizier to the peasant shepherd, they all calmly and peacefully accepted the decree of the annihilation. That was an invitation to their centuries old instincts, and a pleasant one."²¹

Comparing his own artistic literature to those of others entertaining the theme of Turkish-Armenian relationship, he argues that he has given the executioner a face and a character, "In the Armenian novels," he notes, "the Turk is a cliché scarecrow, the ogre of the legend. Oshagan has not retouched the picture, of course, but he has retained the original."²² He analyzes the Turkish character, the genetic elements arousing the drive to loot and kill, the religious determinants conditioning patterns of behavior, and all of this at work in the making of the criminal. The conclusion: "There exist not only criminal people but also criminal races."²³

Throughout the almost 3000 pages of *Mnatsortats* (Remnants), Oshagan uses the words Turk, Turkish, and Turkishness as qualifiers and adjectives synonymous with corruption, criminality, hatred, pitilessness. "Turkish translates into Turkishness without explanation," he writes. "The Turk is the animal outlined by our historians of a thousand years ago, but they gave no explanation either. He kills for want of being able to do something else." Nothing has changed since the first hostile encounter and subjugation of Armenians by the Turkic hordes, the barbarians raiding from Central Asia centuries before WWI. "It was not the outbreak of war [WWI] that made the Turks so much Turk. Before or after the war, it has been the same. The soldier, the volunteer, the layman, the clergy, with an inexplicable smile on their face, would twist the tortured half-dead Armenian prisoner's head and shamelessly ask, 'is your wife pretty?'...."²⁴

Then Oshagan describes two unspeakable, outrageous scenes of the Turk killing or raping, "The deep, inexplicable ugliness of all this,"

he concludes, "I stress these, because the world confuses the massacres with the passion of violence."²⁵ Oshagan describes a Turkish wet-nurse who had found an unusual way to express her hatred for Armenians. In a Turkish orphanage, where Armenian orphans, remnants of the Genocide were being brought up as Turks, she wetted her nipple in poison when nursing an Armenian baby. She was poisoned herself.²⁶

Despite all the strategic planning and preparations, the leaders of the CUP were not able to achieve the total annihilation of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, whereas the prior stages of the genocide of Armenians, as delineated by Gregory Stanton—Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation—had been effectively implemented throughout the years, the stage of Extermination was not entirely successful.²⁷ There remained a mass of survivors some of whom found refuge in different countries of the world, forming new Diasporan communities or joining the existing ones. Others continued living in Turkey, either Islamized (genuinely or pretending), some thoroughly absorbed in the Turkish society, or within small communities mainly in Istanbul, segregated, under constant fear and pressure, discriminated and persecuted, with no voice to tell their wrenching stories, or speak-up against personal and collective ongoing injustices.

The post-WWI Turkish governments and the Turkish society, thus, faced three fronts of unavoidable encounter and relationship with Armenians in the Diaspora, within their own country, and finally, as a new development, in the Republic of Armenia.

The most problematic of these relationships is the one in their own backyard. The Turk who had been given assurance that there would be no Armenians left after the final solution, viewed these Armenian survivors as unjustified "leftovers of the sword," a new moniker added to the old ones. They deserved to die, and if they still existed in Turkey, these *gavours* and *gavouroghlu gavours* were "rejects of the sword" (*kýlýc arýđý*). This was the basis of the Turkish perception of Armenians in post-WWI Turkey.

The generations born to the Armenian survivors in the Diaspora, on the other hand, learned from their parents to fear the Turks, even in some cases hate them for what they had done to their family and their

homeland. It is a known and unchallenged reality that the new Armenian Diaspora is the outcome of the Genocide. The history of the contemporary Armenian Diaspora begins with Genocide. Naturally and consequently, the Genocide, with the whole array of complex influences—psychological, physical, social, economic, and geopolitical—becomes the core of the Diasporan Armenian's identity. It is thus undeniable that the Turkish-Armenian relationship has a heavy bearing on both the Turkish and Armenian identity.

The symbiotic relationship between the descendants of the Armenian survivors and Turkish perpetrators continues. But the basis of this symbiosis has shifted drastically. It is built not on the necessity of coexistence as before, but on the way Turks and Armenians perceive themselves in relation to the other, based on past experience and the perception of the past experience, the Genocide and the memory of the Genocide on both sides. The relationship continues as symbiotic because of the crucial role it plays in the shaping of both identities.

Whereas the Armenian perception of the other—the Turk, the perpetrator of the calamity—is based on the survivors' narratives and the transgenerational transmission of the psychological effects of the traumatic experience of the past—fear of the Turk, hatred, and a feeling of revenge, which by the way triggered the “terrorist” acts in the 70s and 80s²⁸—the Turkish perception of Armenians, to use James Wertsch's terminology, is “textually mediated,” that is, it is shaped by the official Turkish state narrative.

For the majority of new generation Diasporan Armenians, Turkey, Turk, and Turkish have negative connotations. They have learned from their grandparents that there is no such thing as a good Turk. In the case of the generations of Turks growing up after the 70s and 80s, the absolute silence on the existence of an Armenian issue was replaced by the rationalization of the event, by using new terminology, “relocation” or “demographic engineering,” and the reversal of the blame by showing the Armenians as the villain, the traitor, the secessionist, and the collaborator with the enemy to destroy Turkey. This is according to an educational policy to follow strictly the official narrative which, after a period of total silence about the existence of an Armenian issue, shifted direction.

The denial of the Armenian Genocide, as the 8th and last stage of

the act of genocide, is intensified and corroborated with rationalization, trivialization, the blaming of the victims themselves, and euphemistic explanations such as “relocation,” *tehcir*, or “demographic engineering,” for the murder and deportations that occurred. Denial of the Armenian Genocide manifests in all the 12 forms suggested by Israel Charny for any genocide to occur in the world.²⁹ The denial of the Armenian Genocide is at the core of the Turkish identity.

Turkish governments have followed an unchanging policy of instigating in different ways the Muslim society against Christians. A most recent example is “Fatih 1453,” an entirely anti-Christian film about the conquest of Constantinople and the fall of the Christian empire, as well as the film “Seri Gelin” before that. A few years ago, the Ministry of National Education of Turkey organized a writing contest among high school students. The topic was who could best rebut Armenian lies about events during WWI.

The annual report of the US Commission on religious freedom lists Turkey among countries with the least tolerance towards religious minorities. The increasing number of killings of Catholic and Protestant priests is a result of the formally disseminated and harbored anti-Christian ideas. Such manifestations of the prevailing attitude are many. The recent killings and harassment of elderly Armenian women is one, and the ongoing TV interviews and shows about Armenians killing innocent Turks during the war years and Turks suffering as much as Armenians did is another. Turkey is preparing with much vigor for the centennial of the 1915 genocide with completely reversed discourse, a contra-genocide narrative.

With its control stretched over Turkish organizations outside Turkey, the Turkish government ensures the continuation of anti-Armenian sentiments. This effort stems from the fear that Turks traveling abroad for business, education, or emigration may come face to face with the truth and no longer ascribe to the official narrative and prescribed behavior. One example is the utterly distorted position paper disseminated in April 2013 by the ATAA (Assembly of Turkish-American Associations) describing the “revolt of Van” and “the slaughter of innocent Turkish population” as justification for the arrest and imprisonment of Armenian notables in Constantinople in 1915. So too was the letter-writing

campaign by the same Assembly. Turkish-Americans were encouraged to send a form letter to US President Barack Obama, asking him not to use the word genocide in his annual April 24 proclamation, reminding him that it was actually Armenians who killed the Turks, 523,000 of them between the years 1910-1922.

Unfortunately, there are racist Turks and racist groups, organizations, and individuals who are susceptible to embracing the prescribed and propagated anti-Armenian sentiments. There are also Armenians with psychological hang-ups or strong political determinations never ready to accept rapprochement with Turkey and the Turks. And this stance has also spread in the Republic of Armenia whose population was considered by Turkey as softer Armenians with whom it was easier to deal.

As long as this grim symbiosis exists between Turks and Armenians, artificial interventions, directly supported or advocated by foreign entities in the form of opulently financed meetings, joint events, etc., will remain as scratches on the surface with no effect on the disposition of the masses. The continued Turkish denial and inflammatory statements by government officials fuels the conflict. Is healing ever possible after a catastrophe of that magnitude?

Hope is a virtue and despair is a vice. So, I want to end this presentation on an optimistic note.

Human biology tells us that the human species operates on a primitive, reptilian brain, in which violence is a dominant behavioral pattern. It is only culture that can counteract and suppress that part of the human brain. Turkey has taken big strides in terms of culture and civilization. There is hope that this change predominant in intellectual levels will affect both the lower echelon of the society, the mass of Turkish population, as well as the political exigencies of the ruling circle. Then, it is plausible that both sides may engage in the process of healing with genuine resolve to remedy the historical scar inflicted on the souls of both Armenians and Turks.

Notes for Chapter 2

1. Because of these invasions that were coupled with looting, murder, and destruction, during this period, Armenia came out devastated. The ruling class of *Nakharars* (nobles or lords) vanished except for pockets of mountainous and hard-to-reach areas. The settlements of the newcomers, mostly nomadic, in the Armenian plateau and exodus of groups of Armenians fleeing the horrors of the invaders changed the demography of the region. Armenians were a majority hardly anywhere in the predominantly Armenian populated Armenia. Gradually, Asia Minor from east to west with Armenian and Greek Christian population had become Turkish and Muslim.

2. For a brief survey of the situation in Armenia, Armenian life during the Seljuk and Mongol eras, the 14th century invasions of the Timurids, as well as the emergence of Crypto-Christianity among those who were converted to Islam but secretly practiced Christianity, see Robert Bedrosian, "Armenia during the Seljuk and Mongol Period," pp. 241-71, in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, volume I, Richard G. Hovannisian, editor (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

3. See Dickran Kouymjian, "Armenia from the Fall of Cilician kingdom (1375) to the Forced Emigration under Shah Abbas (1604)" in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, volume II, Richard G. Hovannisian, editor (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 22.

4. Examples of famous men of Armenian origin, gathered through the *Devshirme* as young children and brought up as Muslims, are architect Sinan, mid 18th century, and Grand Vizier Khalil of Kayseri, early 17th century. See *ibid.*, p. 47.

5. For a brief discussion of the Revolution by the Young Turks (the Ittihad ve Terrakki Party) that reached Constantinople on July 23, 1908, see Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia, The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 181-82.

6. For a detailed analysis of Zabel Esayan's response to the massacres of Cilician Armenians, see Rubina Perroomian, *Literary Responses to Catastrophe, A Comparison of the Armenian and Jewish Experiences* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1993), pp. 89-116.

7. Zabel Esayan, *Namakner* (Letters), ed. Arpik Avetisian (Yerevan: Yerevan University Press, 1977), pp. 76-77.

8. See Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia, The Survival of a Nation*, pp. 182-88.

9. Esayan, *Letters*, pp. 93-94

10. Zabel Esayan, *Averaknerun mej* (Amid the ruins), multiple editions since 1909 (Beirut: Ervan Press, 1957), p. 40.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.

13. For a detailed analysis of Suren Partevian's response to the massacres of Cilician Armenians, see Peroomian, *Literary Responses to Catastrophe*, pp. 117-150.

14. Suren Partevian, *Kilikian arhavirke* (The Cilician catastrophe) (Constantinople: Neshan Papikian Bookstore, 1909), p. 34.

15. Ibid., p. 169.

16. Ibid., p. 200.

17. For a detailed analysis of Hagop Oshagan's response to the Armenian Genocide, see Peroomian, *Literary Responses to Catastrophe*, pp. 173-215.

18. Hagop Oshagan, *Kayseragan haghtergutun* (Imperial song of triumph), ed. Boghos Snapien (Beirut: Altapress, 1983), p. 27. This collection of five stories about the massacres of 1915 was first published in *Chakatamart* Armenian periodical in 1920 in Constantinople.

19. Ibid., p. 31.

20. Hagop Oshagan, *Mnatsordats* (Remnants), volume II (Cairo: Husaber Press, 1933), p. 192.

21. Hagop Oshagan, *Hamapatker arevmtahay grakanutian* (Panorama of Western Armenian literature), volume 9, (Antilias, Lebanon: The Cilician Catholicosate Press, 1980), p. 278.

22. Hagop Oshagan, *Hamapatker arevmtahay grakanutian* (Panorama of Western Armenian literature), volume 10, Oshagan about himself (Antilias, Lebanon: The Cilician Catholicosate Press, 1982), pp. 8-9.

23. Oshagan, *Panorama*, volume 9, p. 279.

24. *Remnants*, volume II, p. 381.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 417.

27. "The 8 stages of Genocide," Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Extermination, Denial, originally presented as a briefing paper at the US State Department in 1996, by Gregory H. Stanton, President, Genocide Watch. Stanton has since expanded the stages into ten to read, Classification, Symbolization, Discrimination, Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Persecution, Extermination, Denial. See <http://genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html>

28. Frustrated and angered by the continuous Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide, disappointed by the world's silence, and seeing the predicament of diasporan Armenians on the verge of total assimilation and extinction, some groups of young Armenians unleashed a series of attacks on Turkish diplomats and institutions. These acts of assassination and destruction aimed to revenge the murder of their forefathers

from the indifferent and denying descendants of the murderers and to draw world attention to the Armenian Question, urging the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. These acts gave rise to various interpretations in the world news services. Some considered them as acts of Armenian freedom fighters demanding justice. Others labeled them as terrorism. The Turkish government, on the other hand, uses these incidents to teach the world about yet another show of Armenian brutality and treachery against the Turks.

29. Israel Charny, "Templates for Gross Denial of a Known Genocide: A Manual," in *The Encyclopedia of Genocide*, volume 1, page 168. The twelve ways to deny a genocide are the following. 1. Question and minimize the statistics. 2. Attack the motivations of the truth-tellers. 3. Claim that the deaths were inadvertent. 4. Emphasize the strangeness of the victims. 5. Rationalize the deaths as the result of tribal conflict. 6. Blame "out of control" forces for committing the killings. 7. Avoid antagonizing the genocidists, who might walk out of "the peace process." 8. Justify denial in favor of current economic interests. 9. Claim that the victims are receiving good treatment. 10. Claim that what is going on doesn't fit the definition of genocide. 11. Blame the victims. 12. Say that peace and reconciliation are more important than blaming people for genocide.